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Abstract
Grid services will form the base for future computational Grids. Web Services, have been extended to
build Grid services. Grid Services are dened in the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) [22]. The
Globus Alliance has released a Web Service Resource Framework, which is still under development
and which is still missing vital parts. One of them is a Concept that allows Grid-Service Requests to
securely traverse Firewalls, and its realization.
This Thesis aims at the development and realization of a detailed Concept for an Application
Level Gateway for Grid services, based on an existing rough concept. This approach should enable
a strict division between a local network and the Internet. The internet is considered as a untrusted
site and the local network is considered as a trusted site. Grid resources are placed in the internet
as well as in the local network. This means that the possibility to communicate through a rewall is
essential. Some further protocols like Grid Resource Allocation and Management (GRAM) and the
Grid File Transfer Protocol (GridFTP) must be able to traverse the network borders securely as well,
while no further actions must be taken from the user side.
The German Federal Oce for Information Security (BSI) proposes a Firewall - Application Level
Gateway (ALG) - Firewall solution to the German Aerospace Center (DLR) where this Thesis is
written, as a principle approach. In this approach, the local network is divided from the Internet with
two rewalls. Between those rewalls is a demilitarized zone (DMZ), where computers may be placed,
which can be accessed from the Internet and from the local network. An ALG which is placed in this
DMZ should represent the local Grid nodes to the Internet and it should act as a client to the local
nodes. All Grid service requests must be directed to the ALG instead of the protected Grid nodes.
The ALG then checks and validates the requests on the application level (OSI layer 7). Requests that
pose no security threat and fulll certain criteria will then be forwarded to the local Grid nodes. The
responses from the local Grid nodes are checked and validated by the ALG as well.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Grid-computing is seen as a technique that may enable multiple companies or research facilities to
form joint ventures for certain computational tasks. It might also oer excellent ways to organize
large amounts of data. The expectations for Grid computing are high. The ability to form Virtual
Organizations between project partners is highly anticipated. For instance a car manufacturer could
form such a Virtual Organization with one of its component suppliers in order to run simulations dur-
ing the design process of a car with the structural data of the components the supplier produces. The
car manufacturer has of course multiple component suppliers which are not partners, but competi-
tors. The car manufacturer can now build multiple Virtual Organizations (one with each component
supplier), but it must be assured that no component supplier has access to the structural data of
its competitors. This example shows, that security is of a high priority for the practical use of Grid
computing.
Today's Grid computing middleware already oers ways to form Virtual Organizations, but it does
not yet deal with highly secured networks. All participants of a Virtual Organization will usually protect
their data as much as they can. This includes restrictive rewalls which block most communication
protocols. Today's Grid middleware can not deal with those restrictive rewalls and creation of Virtual
Organizations is, due to this issue, not generally possible by now.
The DLR institution Simulations- and Softwaretechnik (SISTEC) is currently developing a software
to manage and setup distributed simulations like those from the example above. A major feature of
this software is, to run such simulations in a Grid. This feature is hardly useful, if the underlying
Grid resources are not able to communicate with each other. That is why SISTEC decided to spend
eorts on the research of this issue. This thesis is part of these research eorts.
The Global Grid Forum (GGF), a user, developer and vendor community which is trying to create
global standards for Grid computing, has recently formed the Firewall-Issue research group (FI-RG),
led by Leon Gommans from the Advanced Internet Research group at the Informatics Institute at
University of Amsterdam. The FI-RG is doing research on problems between Grids and rewalls like
those outlined in the scenario above. The concept described in this thesis as a possible solution for
the problem has been presented by Thijs Metsch from the DLR on the GGF13. It has been perceived
with interest and will probably play a large role in the work of the FI-RG. The author of this thesis
and Thijs Metsch are members of the FI-RG.
This thesis describes an Application Level Gateway or security proxy as a solution for the scenario
above. This concept has been suggested by the BSI as a general approach on rewall problems. The
concept is compared to some other possible solutions and has been implemented as part of the thesis.
The chapter 3 Technical basis will provide technical background information. It will explain what Grid
services are and contains an introduction to rewall technology as well. The problem itself is further
explained in chapter 2 Problem Description and the concept is described and compared in chapter 5
Concept. Chapter 4 Similar Software products is about two existing products which share a common
ground with the software which has been developed as a part of this thesis. This software is explained
in chapter 6 Realization.
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Chapter 2
Problem Description
Some main goals of Grids are the abstraction from resource locations and the creation of virtual
organizations (VO). Foster, Kesselmann and Tuecke dene virtual organizations in the article The
Anatomy of the Grid [8] as
"[. . . ] exible, secure, coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of indi-
viduals, institutions, and resources."
The resources of those VOs are usually distributed over many dierent locations and for security
reasons, the dierent locations should be protected with rewalls (see gure 2.1). While those
rewalls oer a vital protection for the resources, they interrupt communication between the Grid
resources on the dierent locations. Even though Grid services are more ore less rewall friendly,
because they are based on Web services, Grid service messages still can not traverse very restrictive
rewalls. Due to the sensibility of the resources in industrial environments, rewalls which protect
industrial networks will most likely be too restrictive for Grid services.
Figure 2.1: Virtual organization with rewall-protected local networks
There are several work-arounds for this problem, which can only be applied, while security for the
resources is not of high priority. A common one, is to place all Grid resources in a DMZ which is
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only protected by a lax rewall (Another far more restrictive rewall, divides the DMZ from the local
sites network). Resources placed in this DMZ can be accessed from the internet and from the local
network. The problem of this work-around is, that the Grid resources are not highly protected. Of
course they can be accessed from the remote Grid resources, but any attacker has quite a chance to
compromise them as well.
As said before, such work-arounds can not be used in Grids, whenever the Grid resources are
somehow sensible. Which is always the case if industrial partners are involved and may even be the
case when the Grid is just used for research. In such environments, Grid resources will never be
placed inside the DMZ, but in the well protected local network. This leads to the conclusion, that
a mechanism needs to be dened, which enables Grid service messages to traverse even restrictive
rewalls while the security of the local site is not at risk.
The DLR institution SISTEC encountered this problem when they tried to aggregate their local
Grid resources with those of the Fraunhofer-Institute for Algorithms and Scientic Computing (SCAI).
Even though these Institutions cooperate very closely with each other, the rewalls posed obstacles
which could not be overcome. Moving the Grid resources into the DMZ was not an option due to the
licenses of some applications that where to run in the aggregated Grid, which only applied to machines
in the local networks. Several concepts have been outlined to solve this problem. The Concept which
seemed to be the only one that is generally applicable and secure enough, is the use of an Application
Level Gateway, which is placed in the DMZ and transparently allows access to the Grid resources (see
section 5.2 Application Level Gateway). Such an ALG would be accessible from both, the internet
and the local network. It would be able to accept messages from the internet, check and validate
them and forward them to their original receivers if they succeed validation. The answers would then
be send to the ALG and forwarded to the original clients. If trac from the DMZ into the local net
is disallowed, the ALG must cache messages and another ALG, placed in the local network, must
fetch the cached messages regularly. This concept is addressed in this Thesis and further elucidated
in section 5.2 Application Level Gateway .
The example of the SISTEC/SCAI Grid shows, that the problem is not only a theoretical problem,
but has quite some relevance for the practical usability of computational Grids. Even though both
institutions work together very closely and often appear to project partners as a single Metainstitute,
it was not possible to merge their Grid systems. A problem, almost every VO will probably encounter,
when security policies have to be considered. Additionally to security policies, software licenses that
are bound to certain machines can lead to the outlined problem.
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Chapter 3
Technical basis
This Chapter describes some technical basics in order to understand the problem, and the solution
which is proposed and developed in this Thesis, as well as the concept which lies behind that solution.
The section 3.1 Grid Services explains what Grid services are. It therefor includes a short description
of web services, which form the base of Grid services. The Simple Object Access Protocol is described,
because it is the usual protocol Web services use. In section 3.2 Firewalls some basics about rewall
technology and packet ltering are described.
3.1 Grid Services
During the evolution of Grid software, several approaches to the problems of grid computing have
emerged. One of them is the concept of Grid services which is described in this section. Grid services
are dened by the OGSA [9, 7, 5]. In short, OGSA Grid services are web services (see section
3.1.3 Web Services), which implement certain interfaces (also known as portTypes). In OGSA/Web
Service Resource Framework (WSRF) based Grids, everything from computational resources over
storage resources to networks and programs is represented as a service. Section 3.1.1 The Open Grid
Service Architecture will give further insight into OGSA. According to [6], Grid service based Grids
can be seen as the third generation of Grid systems. As stated in [6], these third-generation Grid
systems are becoming more and more automated and autonomous. An attribute that is one of the
goals of a service based Grid architecture.
3.1.1 The Open Grid Service Architecture
The Open Grid Service Architecture as proposed and outlined in [7] and dened in [9] is a service
oriented Grid architecture, which addresses the need of Grid computing for standardization. It calls for
capabilities which address certain key concerns of Grid computing, like authorization and membership
of virtual organizations. It demands dynamic and heterogeneous environment support and interop-
erability in such environments. In addition it asks for the ability to integrate existing legacy systems
into the Grid. The ability to virtualize resources, which means, that Grid services may be aggregated
in order to create higher level Grid services, is also required. Common management capabilities are
demanded in order to simplify the administration of such dynamic and heterogeneous environments as
well as mechanisms for resource discovery and query. [9] states that a service based Grid architecture
like OGSA must enable resource sharing between dierent organizations and still oer the possibility,
to optimize resource allocation. Furthermore it must be possible to assure certain qualities of service
if needed. And mechanisms for job submission, including the support for dierent job types as well as
management of submitted jobs, scheduling and resource provisioning mus be contained. It must be
capable of providing integrated data access and ensuring data consistence and persistence.
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3.1.2 From OGSA to WSRF
In [7] Foster et al. explain and outline OGSA. They dene a service, as a network-enabled entity which
provides some capability. After a short discussion about how a Grid service could be accomplished,
they identify Web services and the Web Service Denition Language (WSDL) as a good basis for Grid
services. Some qualities of Web services and WSDL lead the OGSA Working Group (OGSA-WG) to
this conclusion. These qualities are the ability to dene service interfaces clearly and distinguished from
the protocol bindings for service invocation. This service based approach allows distributed protocol
bindings as well as locally optimized bindings for service invocation, which is a great advantage when it
comes to Grid computing. The service implementation is also distinguished from interface denition
and protocol binding. With basing OGSA on Web services and WSDL, OGSA adopts all these
features.
However, this does not clarify, what the dierences between Web services and Grid services are.
While Web services and WSDL only provide means to dene interfaces and invoke services (of course
with the qualities mentioned above), Foster et al. came to the conclusion, that Grid services required
well dened semantics as well. These semantics should assure, that all Grid services follow the same
conventions for things like error notication and creation, as well as termination. They therefore
proposed a set of well-dened standard interfaces, which address those conventions. This means,
that a Web service, which implements those well-dened interfaces becomes a Grid service. A rst
specication of interfaces a Web service must implement to become a Grid service has been done
in the OGSI Working Group (OGSI-WG) and published in [22]. As Web services evolved, the Open
Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI) specications have been refactored into the WSRF [5]. That
refactoring process and relations between OGSI and WSRF are explained in [4]. WSRF contains all
functionality which has been specied in [22], but partitions it into ve specications and changes
some syntax. Admittedly [5] is a draft document and [9] will most likely be subject to further work.
This shows that the concrete Grid service is not yet clearly specied. Final interfaces may vary from
those proposed in those documents, but the direction and the basic concept are clear.
3.1.3 Web Services
This section contains a short description of Web services and the underlying Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP). Explaining the functionality and features of Web services is out of the scope
of this thesis. This section only contains short summaries of technical basics. For further insight
see [25] which contains detailed descriptions of protocol specications and functionalities as well as
architecture explanations.
Web services are software applications, which are identied with a Uniform Resource Identier
(URI). Each Web service implements a concrete interface which is dened with the WSDL [3]. The
interfaces in WSDL are called portTypes. A client discovers the Web service and its description for
example over a discovery service or a registry. The Web service description contains the information
that is necessary to invoke the service. By obtaining the description, the client gains the ability to
invoke the service 1. This is done by sending a message to the Web service, which contains method
name and parameters. The Web service responses that request with another Message which contains
the results of the method invocation. See Figure 3.1
Web services commonly use SOAP for communication. Another protocol that may be used is
eXtensible Markup Language - Remote Procedure Call (XML-RPC). SOAP is further described in
section 3.1.4 The Simple Object Access Protocol .
It can be said, that Web services are for machines, what Web sites are for humans. A tting
example is the Google API [10], which enables applications to search the internet with the Google
search engine (http://www.google.de), and enables them to use the search results. Without such a
Web service, an application would have to parse the Google result page, which is quite a hard task.
1of course the client might have known the description without discovery
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Figure 3.1: Interaction with Grid services [19]
Web services are often compared to the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA),
where interfaces are dened in the Interface Denition Language (IDL) and may be implemented in
any programming language. WSDL is for Web services, what IDL is for CORBA and Web services
share some aspects with CORBA, but while CORBA follows a object oriented approach, Web services
are, as the name says, service oriented.
3.1.4 The Simple Object Access Protocol
The SOAP [14] is a protocol for the exchange of structured and typed data, based on the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML). It is a simple and lightweight message based protocol which can be used
with any transport protocol (i.e. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)). A SOAP Message consists
out of a mandatory envelope, which contains an optional header and a mandatory body element. Inside
the header, optional header entries make it possible to provide additional information or metadata.
The body contains body entries, which contain all essential information for the recipient.
SOAP can encapsulate remote procedure calls. Required entries for such a task are a URI which
identies the recipient, the name of the method that shall be invoked and its parameters. Applications
which use SOAP for remote procedure calls, do not need to know about the implementation of the
method. This is quite important for Web and Grid services.
Another of SOAPs features is an encoding mechanism for serialization of application-specic data
types. As stated in [25], this mechanism might reduce development eort but may also lead to
interoperability problems in heterogeneous systems.
3.2 Firewalls
The term rewall covers a large eld of technologies. The original denition of a rewall is the
implementation of a security policy. Today's rewalls vary vastly in functionality. In order to clear
this up a bit, this section describes packet lter and content lters. But you should note that the
concept described in chapter 5 Concept could also be referred to as a rewall, and it might as well
be implemented in a single hardware device.
Firewalls are used to protect networks from attacks and to lter unwanted trac. They consist
out of ltering software, that screens incoming and outgoing network trac. The trac is ltered
according to specic rules so packets will either be dropped or forwarded. There are dierent levels
of ltering used in rewalls. The packet lter (section 3.2.1 Packet Filter) lters Internet Protocol
(IP) packets one by one without knowledge of the content or complete data stream. Content lters
are able to lter the content of several packets at once (section 3.2.2 Content Filter).
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Usually, rewall architectures include a DMZ. The DMZ can be described as a location which is
neither in the local network, nor in the external network, but next to the rewall. For the ease of
illustration just imagine it as the location between two rewalls. For example, one rewall has a rule
set, that allows most trac, and one rewall has a rule set that is more restrictive and disallows a lot
more connections. The place between these two rewalls is the DMZ. Resources that don't need a
high level of protection but use certain protocols that would be blocked by the restrictive rewall can
be placed in the DMZ for full functionality. This setup is illustrated in gure 3.2. Actually hardware
rewall devices exist and their setup determines which resources should be treated as if they where in
a DMZ.
Figure 3.2: A local network, protected with two rewalls and DMZ between those rewalls.
3.2.1 Packet Filter
Packet lters are the lowest level of rewall technology. They lter IP packets, and make decisions
based on rules and the contents of the IP-Header. This Header contains the IP-Address of sender
and receiver, checksums and some other information (e.g. time to live, max hops). IP-packets wrap
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. These protocols
have additional header information which is usually used for ltering too. Packet lters have no
knowledge of the protocol that is transmitted with TCP or UDP and for that reason can not lter
the content. Packet lters can be used to disallow trac from certain hosts and blocking of ports.
Blocking of ports is sometimes referred to as blocking of protocols, which is not correct. Protocols
are independent of the used port and can be used with any port, but they usually only use one specic
port (e.g. HTTP usually uses port 80, but if a packet lter is set to block port 80, this will not disallow
all HTTP trac. A HTTP server listening on port 8080 or any other port would not be aected by
that rule). For this reason, administrators tend to block as many ports as possible (e.g. all unused
ports), in order to block all unwanted protocols. By opening a single port for an application, they
enable every application to run over that port.
3.2.2 Content Filter
A content lter is able to lter the content of trac that passes the rewall. It therefore collects
complete data streams (which means, that it collects all packages which belong together). It needs
knowledge about the protocol, which is transmitted and it must understand that protocol. Content
lters can be used to remove certain parts of the content, e.g. JavaScript from a HTML document.
These tasks are very complicated and usually not part of a rewall. If they are, they are restricted
to ltering of a few protocols like HTTP or data formats like HTML. The content ltering is usually
done by other special software (e.g. Virus scanners, SPAM-lters, Intrusion Detection Systems etc)
which is employed after the use of a rewall, respective a packet lter. Figure 3.3 illustrates on which
network layers of the TCP/IP modell the dierent lters work. You should note, that the presented
concept and the content lters share some common ground and the concept might be integrated in
rewalls as well.
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Figure 3.3: Network layers and corresponding lters.
Roland Gude 11
Design and Implementation
of a Security Gateway
for Grid Services
Roland Gude 12
Design and Implementation
of a Security Gateway
for Grid Services
Chapter 4
Similar Software products
This chapter will give a short overview over software products, which have similarities with the ALG,
designed as part of this thesis. This comparison has already been done as a part of the requirement
analysis for the ALG [12]. During the research for [12] two relevant software products have been
identied. The rst product is the Xtradyne Web Service Domain Boundary Controller and the second
product is the MultiNet iSecure Web Services Gateway. Both products aim at similar problems as the
ALG but do not target Grid services. The scope of both products only includes ordinary Web services.
The Xtradyne Web Service Domain Boundary Controller (WS-DBC) is an Application Level Gate-
way based approach to secure Web services transparently. This is exactly what the designed ALG
should do for Grid services. WS-DBC features a SOAP content inspection and Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) assertions. It is able to provide a secure gateway to Web services. The
concept and the features of WS-DBC are described in [2, 23, 24]. According to those references,
WS-DBC does not provide all features which are needed for Grid services. The following quote is
taken from [12]:
WS-DBC and Fireblade both share the same approach to secure Web/Grid Services.
WS-DBC already features a lot of authentication methods like X.509 or SAML, but its
scope is limited to Web Services, while Fireblade addresses Grid Services. The main
dierence is, that Grid Services often use protocols, that are not SOAP based, e.g.
GridFTP or GASS. Those protocols can transfer any type of data between to nodes and
will use SOAP messages only to initialise a data transfer. WS-DBC is not able to handle
such data transfers. Additionally WS-DBC only validates SOAP-Messages against given
schema les. It does not provide functionality to change message contents (e.g. for
mapping of users from internal to external users).
The designed ALG does not provide all these functionalities that have been identied as missing
features of WS-DBC, but instead it will make it easy to develop and add new features on demand
(see Chapter 6 Realization).
The second software product which has been compared to the ALG is the MultiNet iSecure Web
Services Gateway [15, 21]. Like WS-DBC and the solution proposed in this Thesis, it is based on an
ALG architecture. The following statement is taken from [12]:
The MultiNet iSecure Web Services Gateway is, like Xtradyne WS-DBC an ALG-
based approach for securing Web Services. It addresses several security issues for Web
Services, but it does neither provide end-to-end security like WS-DBC, nor is it able to
handle protocols like GridFTP or GASS. It does not oer any authorization methods as
well. MultiNet iSecure WebService Gateway is meant as a complement to Software that
possesses these features.
The fact that at least two products identied similar problems for Web services and try to solve
those problems with a similar concept shows, that the ALG-based approach goes into the right
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direction. However both products lack certain features that are necessary in order to provide a
security gateway for Grid services.
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Chapter 5
Concept
Dierent concepts may provide a solution for the problem described in chapter 2 Problem Description.
This chapter will give some insight into the chosen concepts and it will present some advantages over
other concepts, which have also been considered.
The following concepts have been considered:
 SSH tunneling
 Virtual Private Network (VPN) plus Grid nodes in the DMZ
 Application Level Gateway
5.1 Comparison of dierent concepts
This section briey describes the dierent concepts and compares them with each other. Every
subsection features a table which shows the major advantages and disadvantages from the dierent
concepts.
5.1.1 SSH tunneling based approach
The rst concept, SSH tunneling, was the rst solution which was considered, when SISTEC and
SCAI encountered problems with rewalls while creating a VO. The idea behind this concept is, to
create Secure Shell (SSH) tunnels for all necessary connection paths. This would require machines in
the local networks of each participating institution, which would be starting points of such tunnels.
Such an approach has been made by HP Laboratories Palo Alto in 2002 (see [11]1) with Globus
Toolkit 2. The following quote from [11] describes the concept briey. See table 5.1 for an overview
about this concept.
The basic idea behind port tunneling is to open an encrypted connection to a remote
host and forward all local connections to certain ports to referred ports at the remote
host (or vise versa).
Advantages
SSH is a widely spread protocol which can be considered as stable. Even inexperienced system
administrators will possess knowledge about SSH and know how to setup SSH-Tunnels. Additionally
it is powerful and can enable any Grid communication between dierent nodes through SSH-Tunnels.
There are no limitations on the protocols it supports, because it works on TCP/IP level. All trac
transmitted through those tunnels is encrypted and thus resistant against wiretapping.
1Some more concepts are discussed in [11], but considered signicantly inferior to the Tunneling approach.
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Advantages Disadvantages
all features complex setup
protection against wiretapping complex conguration
stable no reusable setup
no new software needed no reusable conguration
dicult automation
Table 5.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a SSH tunneling based approach
Advantages Disadvantages
protection against wiretapping limited to job submission
no new software needed represented resources are invisible for users
not to complex conguration dicult automation
Table 5.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a VPN based approach
Disadvantages
Even though the setup process for a single SSH-Tunnel is quite easy, the conguration and setup
needed for this approach becomes a major drawback. At rst the number of needed ports can be
extremely high and it might be necessary to open a large number of tunnels. Because the tunnels
may be accessed by anyone who has access to the start-point of the tunnel, it might be a security
risk to leave the tunnels open when not needed. This means that they have to be opened whenever
the Grid should be used. A problem might rise because that process can not easily be automated
(Due to security policies of the participants). Every participating institution needs access to all other
institutions in order to open the tunnels (which might be a security threat). This means that for each
usage of the joined Grid, the users would have to talk to the responsible system administrators in
order to initialize the setup. Another burden is the conguration of the Grid nodes. They would have
to be congured in a way which makes them use the SSH-Tunnels instead of a direct connection to
a certain machine.
5.1.2 VPN based approach
The second concept, using VPN and Grid nodes in the DMZ would require less conguration than SSH
Tunneling. It features some similarity with the nally chosen concept. All participating Institutions
would place one Grid node in their DMZ, and congure it in a way that communication from that
Grid node into the local network would be possible. In order to fulll services, it should invoke services
from the other grid services. All those Grid nodes placed in the DMZ could than be connected with
a VPN in order to disable access from unauthorized users. Although this solution seems to be much
better than the SSH tunneling approach, it has its disadvantages as well.
Advantages
The setup for this concept would be signicantly smaller than for the SSH-tunneling approach. Each
institution should only have to congure one additional machine in the DMZ for Grid communication
and VPN. Like SSH-Tunneling, this solution oers encryption for the trac.
Disadvantages
The described setup would not enable all possible Grid communications. It would be limited to job
submission. Services which require direct connections between several nodes might become impossible.
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Advantages Disadvantages
transparent communication limited to supported protocols
easy setup conguration might become hard
possibility of content ltering eventually a bottleneck
possibility of content validation
Table 5.3: Advantages and disadvantages of an ALG based approach
Furthermore, users would not be able to see the Grid resources which are represented by the nodes
in the DMZ. This would disable the selection of concrete resources for a computation. Another
drawback is, that the VPN can most likely not be opened automatically due to security policies of
participating institutions (similar to the identied disadvantage of the SSH-Tunneling approach).
5.1.3 ALG based approach
An ALG is a system, which understands an application level protocol and lters network trac on that
protocols layer. It is placed between the actual communicating resources which instead of sending
their data directly to their communication partner, send it to the ALG. The ALG acts as if it would
be the original communication partner, accepts and lters the messages and relays them to their
destination. The same happens with responses. This is similar to the content lter of a rewall (see
section 3.2.2 Content Filter). Such a setup would enable transparent communication between all
involved Grid nodes, which means that neither applications running in the Grid, nor the Grid nodes
themselves would need signicant conguration changes. However the installation and conguration
of such an ALG might become dicult. A drawback for this concept is, that an ALG needs high level
knowledge about all protocols used for Communication between Grid nodes. In theory, Grid nodes
can communicate with any protocol. Certain Grid services might even introduce their own protocol
for some communication. Grid nodes which are connected with an ALG have their communication
limited to those protocols, the ALG understands and supports.
Advantages
Setting up an ALG is generally not a hard task (except for conguration, which might become
dicult). Only one additional machine is needed in the DMZ and the nodes must be congured to
talk to that machine instead of the real Grid nodes. This solution would be transparent and would
work fully automated, which means that Administrators would not have to open ports on demands
or setup tunnels each time a computation runs. Additionally an ALG based approach adds the ability
to lter and validate transmitted data and metadata. This might increase the security of a Grid
signicantly.
Disadvantages
The greatest disadvantage of this concept is, that it might become a bottleneck for communication
processes (all communication has to be done with the ALG). An ALG based setup would be limited
to a subset of all possible communication protocols, because the support for each protocol must be
implemented, too (unlike the SSH approach which works on a lower level and has no knowledge about
communication protocols). Furthermore the conguration of the ALG might become a hard task.
5.2 Application Level Gateway
Neither the setup of SSH tunnels, nor the utilisation of additional Grid nodes in the DMZ provided a
reusable and generally applicable solution for the problem described in chapter 2 Problem Description.
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The third and most sophisticated concept leads to such a reusable solution. This is the chosen concept
which introduces an Application Level Gateway and thereby enables a transparent communication
between all grid nodes.
An ALG for Grid services must understand Grid service messages, which are SOAP messages
(see chapter 3 Technical basis). But unlike a content lter, the ALG would not only have to lter
those messages, but it would have to provide proxies for the requested services in many cases. This
is due to the fact, that services are not restricted to SOAP messages for their communication. In
order to support non-SOAP communication between the Grid nodes, the ALG would have to identify
the initialization of such communications (which is done via SOAP) and it has to create a proxy
for that communication on the y. The SOAP messages which initialises the communication has
to be changed, in order to force the usage of the created proxy. In order to create and provide
those proxies, the non-SOAP protocols have to be supported by the ALG. If service requests would
initialise communication over protocols the ALG does not understand, the ALG should not forward
those messages and it should inform the client about that error. Obviously, this would require the
ALG to have knowledge about the initialization process of all protocols. A requirement which cannot
be fullled due to the high number of possible protocols. Instead of sending error messages whenever
services are requested which may use unsupported protocols, those services should not even be exposed
to the outside. The decision which services are going to be exposed to the outside has to be done by
a system administrator and can not be done automatically.
Figure 5.1 shows how an ALG which is placed in the DMZ of a institution can enable Grid
communication. Note that the DMZ is represented as the space between two rewalls as described
in section 3.2 Firewalls.
Figure 5.1: Application Level Gateway enabling a VO with rewall-protected local networks
As already stated in chapter 2 Problem Description, a rewall can deny incoming trac even
from the resources in the DMZ. In that case two ALGs are needed to enable Grid communication
over a rewall. ALG one is placed in the DMZ (like in gure 5.1) and ALG two is placed in the
local network. ALG one has to cache all incoming requests because it is not able to forward them
through the rewall. Nevertheless it is accessible from ALG two, which may query ALG one for cached
messages. ALG two than forwards the messages to the appropriate resources and sends the answers
to ALG one. ALG one can then forward those answers to the original recipients. This setup is shown
in gure 5.2 Additional polling ALG for extremely restrictive rewall environments. The following
quote is taken from the Catalogue of Requirements [12].
"An ALG is placed in the DMZ and reacts to requests from the Internet as if it was the
requested resource. Therefor it acts as a client for the requested resource and forwards
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the requests to that resource. After it has received an answer it will forward the answer
to the original client.
The ALG must be able to understand the protocols which are used to determine which
resource has been requested and must be congured to allow or disallow certain requests.
Due to the high number of Grid communication protocols and the fast development in
that area, an ALG for Grid Services must be highly extensible."
Figure 5.2: Additional polling ALG for extremely restrictive rewall environments
This concept has some advantages over the other concepts. It does not require any conguration
except for the conguration of the ALG. None of the Grid nodes needs knowledge of the ALG. All
types of service can be made possible with a sophisticated ALG. Even though this might be a hard
task in many cases. Of course this concept has a disadvantage, too. It has a performance bottleneck.
All requests to a rewall protected node have to be processed by the ALG, which creates latency and
lowers the throughput.
5.3 Requirements
The requirements for this project are documented in the Catalogue of Requirements [12]. This section
summarizes the requirements from that document which contains user proles, prerequisites and
duties, dependencies, functional requirements and demands on quality. The functional requirements
are modelled as Use-Cases which are included and explained in section 5.3.4 Use-Cases.
5.3.1 User Proles
As stated in [12], the typical user of the ALG is an experienced system administrator. Knowledge of
rewalls and proxy-servers is required as well as knowledge about the institutions network structure
and security policy. In order to enable Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption, the administrator must
be able to acquire all certicates of involved Grid nodes. Further requirements on the user might
arise through further extensions (units or plugins) of the ALG (e.g. a Supplier which uses CORBA to
deliver messages will most likely require CORBA knowledge).
Those users who will just run computations on the Grid or developers of Grid applications should
never have to deal with the ALG. This means that there are no requirements on the knowledge of
those people.
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5.3.2 Prerequisites, Duties and Dependencies
The ALG should integrate into existing environments easily and it has to provide high availability
(because it provides the only way to access certain Grid resources). It should be able to do load
balancing, because it is performance critical. Additionally, it must be very easy to add new features
and support for new protocols to the ALG. And like every software product, the source code has to
be well documented. The process of extending the ALG has to be documented well to. 2
5.3.3 Demands on Quality
The demands on quality identied in [12] are the following:
The ALG must run on normal out of the box computers (2005 - Pentium IV, 512M RAM).
Load sharing must be possible.
Downtimes must be reduced to a minimum. Availability of the ALG is of a high priority.
The ALG must be congured by an easy to use Graphical User Interface to avoid miss con-
guration. Password protection for the Administration is an absolute must. All set-
tings can only be made by the Administrator.
Security is one of the major features of the Application Level Gateway. Security Pol-
icy must be to disallow everything from the beginning and allow certain specied connec-
tions later.
However those demands do not apply to the software version developed as part of this Thesis. This is
due to the fact that it would not be possible to develop a Software addressing all identied requirements
within the time which is available for a Bachelorthesis. Especially performance and GUI conguration
have a low priority for a rst implementation. They will be required in further advanced versions
nevertheless.
5.3.4 Use-Cases
All Use-Cases in this subsection (Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6) are taken from the Catalogue of
Requirements [12] and created by Roland Gude and Thijs Metsch, as part of the requirement analysis.
The explanations are summaries of those from [12].
The rst use-case diagram (gure 5.3) shows the basic functionality of the ALG. It shows how
the dierent actors (Client, Administrator, Grid and Developer) interact with the ALG. The Client
can be any source of a Grid service request, e.g. a Grid service from remote Grid nodes. Grid
describes the local Grid nodes which should be protected by the ALG. Developers are those persons
who actually work on the ALG (e.g. create units or plugins), but not the developers of Grid services.
The Administrator is the maintainer of the ALG, who installs and activates units and plugins or denes
the conguration. The use handler unit use-case is modelled in gure 5.5 and 5.4. The requests are
accepted from the ALG (actually from the consumer), the deployed handler units inspect, validate and
modify the MessageContext for that request (and possibly the request itself), and the ALG invokes
the Grid service (using the supplier).
Figure 5.4 shows the interaction of the ALG's core with the dierent actors. Possible actors
are cores from other ALG installations, Administrators or units. Administrators congure the core
(e.g. the use-case order describes that they dene the order in which the handler units should be
used) and other cores just interact in order to achieve load balancing. The interaction between units
and the core is a more complex. Whenever a unit has nished handling of a request, it passes the
MessageContext back to the core. The core now selects the next unit (which is dened by the order
of the units) and sends the MessageContext to that unit.
2A document providing a detailed description on the process of unit/plugin-development is currently under devel-
opment ([13]). This thesis provides some information on the unit/plugin-development process in section 6.3 Plugin
Architecture.
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Figure 5.3: Use-Case: Basic functionalities of the ALG
Figure 5.4: Use-Case: Functionalities of the ALG-Core
The unit use-case diagram (gure 5.5) shows how the ALG units works and interact with other
actors. The actors in this context may either be the core of the ALG, an administrator or the plugins
which extend the unit. The core asks for handling of a MessageContext. The unit then modies
the MessageContext (not necessarily the message) and utilizes appropriate plugins for further tasks.
When all plugins have done their tasks, the MessageContexts history is updated and the Message is
nalized, which means it is handed back to the core.
The last use-case diagram (gure 5.6) shows the interaction between units and their plugins from
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Figure 5.5: Use-Case: Functionalities of the ALG-Units
the perspective of the plugins. The Context receives a MessageContext from the unit it extends and
handles that MessageContext. When this is done, it hands back the MessageContext to the unit.
The plugin may be congured by an administrator of course.
Figure 5.6: Use-Case: Functionalities of the ALG-Unit-Plugins
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Chapter 6
Realization
This chapter contains information about the software development and the developed software, but
it is neither a complete requirements analysis nor a concept and design manual. At DLR, both
documents are being worked on currently, and this chapter will refer to them several times and
even quote certain parts of the current drafts. These documents have not yet been published, so
this Thesis contains the most detailed information about the developed solution, that is currently
available. Additionally this chapter contains information about major software products that have
been used for the realization of the ALG, namely AXIS, an open-source java based SOAP engine and
the Java Plugin Framework (JPF) which has been employed to guarantee the demanded high grade
of extensibility for this software.
6.1 Basic Software Architecture
The developed ALG has a highly extensible architecture, shown in gure 6.1. On top of an application
core several units are deployed to handle the SOAP messages which reach the ALG. Two units have
a special role in this architecture, namely the consumer unit and the supplier unit. The consumer unit
is the part of the ALG where new SOAP requests arrive and responses are forwarded to their original
destination. The supplier unit is the part which forwards checked messages to the original recipient
and accepts the answers. The units between consumer and supplier are the handler units. They can
be used for all other tasks that have to be done whenever a message arrives (e.g. validation of user
names). While no handler units are required for the ALG to use (though that might not make to
much sense), consumer and supplier unit are mandatory.
units may be further extended with plugins. Some possible plugins are marked with dotted lines
in gure 6.1. The Consumer unit could be extended with several plugins. For example one which
receives messages over HTTP, one that receives them over email or one which queries them from
another ALGs cache. A unit which is intended to check whether a message is acceptable might
contain plugins which check the user name as well as plugins which check whether the requested
resource should be visible for that user. It might as well contain plugins which contain certain checks
that are necessary in order to support certain Grid Protocols like GridFTP.
Messages are represented together with some status information as a MessageContext instance.
units that have performed their tasks with a message, update the history of the associated Message-
Context and hand the message over to the core. The core evaluates the MessageContext instance
(e.g. checks the history and status information) and selects the next unit which should handle the
message. The selected unit then performs its tasks and hands the message back to the core after-
wards.
You can imagine the ALG as a bidirectional pipe of handling units, managed by a core. The
internal communication between the core and the units is modeled in the UML sequence diagram
gure 6.2. In gure 6.1 the consumer unit would be the entrance point of the pipe and the supplier
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would be the pipes exit (and entrance point for the responses). A message arriving at an ALG with
those units shown in gure 6.1 would pass the following stations in that order:
1. request received by the consumer unit.
2. consumer unit creates MessageContext from the request.
3. consumer hands the MessageContext to the core.
4. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to the next unit, which is
the authorization unit.
5. authorization unit checks the MessageContext with the Virtual Organization Membership Ser-
vice (VOMS) plugin.
6. authorization unit updates the MessageContext (history and status) and hands it to the core.
7. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to mapping and validation
unit.
8. the MaV unit validates the request and maps from external to internal users, updates the
MessageContext and hands it to the core.
9. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to the supplier unit.
10. the supplier unit delivers the request.
11. the supplier receives the response, updates the MessageContext and hands it back to the core.
12. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to the mapping and validation
unit.
13. the MaV unit validates the request and maps from internal to external users, updates the
MessageContext and hands it to the core.
14. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to the authorization unit.
15. authorization unit checks the MessageContext with the VOMS plugin.
16. core checks status and history of the MessageContext and hands it to the consumer unit.
17. the consumer delivers the response.
6.2 Used Software
This section describes briey which major software products have been employed in order to design
and realize the developed ALG. This is not a list of all used libraries, but contains only those software
products that had signicance when it came to the overall software design. The software has been
developed in the Java programming language with the use of the Eclipse IDE and Subversion as a
version management tool.
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Figure 6.1: Basic Architecture of the developed ALG.
Figure 6.2: UML sequence diagram of the communication process with between a client, the ALG
and a resource.
6.2.1 Axis
Axis [1] is an open-source java SOAP implementation. All messages, sent in Grid service context
are such SOAP messages. Axis is used to represent those SOAP messages to the ALG. It is used
for everything that has to do with SOAP in the ALG, like generation of error messages. The ALG
can access the messages by utilizing the axis API. This renders XML parsing for message validation
unnecessary.
The following quotation is from the Axis User Guide at [1].
Axis is essentially a SOAP engine { a framework for constructing SOAP processors such
as clients, servers, gateways, etc. The current version of Axis is written in Java, but a
C++ implementation of the client side of Axis is being developed.
All SOAP messages are represented to the ALG using de.dlr.reblade.message.MessageContext
(see section 6.4.1 MessageContext. It uses the javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage implementation from
Roland Gude 25
Design and Implementation
of a Security Gateway
for Grid Services
Axis (org.apache.axis.Message) to do so. This enables the ALG to create and parse SOAP messages.
6.2.2 Java Plugin Framework
The Java Plugin Framework enables the development of plugin based architectures. It provides classes
and interfaces to write plugins, as well as a central plugin manager and a plugin registry. It is able to
discover plugins that are installed and to check whether the dependencies (upon other plugins) for a
discovered plugin have been met.
This is what the project Web site [17] states about JPF:
"The Framework implements the runtime engine that dynamically discovers and runs
plugins. A plugin is a structured component that describes itself to the Framework using
a manifest le. The Framework maintains a registry of available plugins and the function
they provide (via extension points and extensions).
A general goal of the Framework is that the application (and end user using it) should
not pay a memory or performance penalty for plugins that are installed, but not used.
A plugin can be installed and added to the registry (even when application is running),
but the plugin will not be activated unless a functionality provided by the plugin has been
requested according to the user's activity."
JPF is used to achieve the high grade of demanded extensibility. The base classes of the ALG
(de.dlr.reblade.core.Core, de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.Unit, de.dlr.reblade.unit.plugin.Plugin) are all
derived from the JPF org.jpf.plugin.Plugin class. In order to extend the core, a new unit has to
be written by subclassing de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.Unit and its manifest le is needed as well. In
order to extend a unit (like the consumer or the supplier, though the reference implementations do
not dene any extension points and due to this are not extensible), a new plugin must be written by
subclassing de.dlr.reblade.unit.plugin.Plugin and its manifest le must be created. The more detailed
documentation [13], including coding standards is currently under development.
6.3 Plugin Architecture
In order to extend the ALG, a developer has two possibilities (besides modication of the source code
of the ALG itself). He can either develop a unit or a plugin for the ALG. The dierence between a
unit and a plugin is simple. units extend the ALG, plugins extend a certain unit. A simple example
would be the following. A developer who wants to add the functionality to check the user name
included in a Grid request against valid user names would write a unit to do this task. For a rst
deployment he only needs to check if the user name is included in a certain le. In order to extend
this functionality later, he denes a extension point for his unit and develops a plugin which attaches
to that extension point and checks a given user name against a list it gets from a certain le. Some
time later he realizes that checking the user name against user names in a le is not sucient for his
needs any more. He now creates a new plugin extending his unit, which checks a user name against
a LDAP-Server (or something similar).
The developed implementation of the ALG includes some abstract classes which enable the cre-
ation of new units and Plugins.
 de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.Unit
 de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.plugin.Plugin
In order to create a new Unit, a developer has to subclass de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.Unit and imple-
ment the abstract methods. Furthermore he needs to create a manifest le (see 6.2.2 Java Plugin
Framework) for this Unit.
A unit might look like this:
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import de.dlr.fireblade.unit.Unit;
import de.dlr.fireblade.unit.exceptions.UnitException;
import de.dlr.fireblade.core.CoreInterface;
import org.java.plugin.PluginDescriptor;
import org.java.plugin.PluginManager;
public class MyNewShinyUnit extends Unit {
//A parameter name for some parameter which is read from the configuration file
private final static String PARAM_PARAMETERNAME = "my.new.unit.param";
//the default value for the parameter
private final static String DEFAULT_PARAMETERNAME = "defaultvalue";
//private String myVariable;
//A Constructor
public MyNewShinyUnit(PluginManager mgr ,PluginDescriptor desc) {
super(mgr, desc);
}
//Initialisation of the unit, which must be called before it is usable
public void init(File dataFolder, CoreInterface core) throws UnitException{
super.init(dataFolder, core);
//extracting the parameters from the configuration properties
try {
if (myProperties.getProperty(PARAM_PARAMETERNAME == null) {
throw new NullPointerException();
}
myVariable = myProperties.getProperty(PARAM_PARAMETERNAME);
} catch (NullPointerException e) {
myVariable = DEFAULT_PARAMETERNAME;
}
}
//implementing those abstract methods
/**
*
* message handling that is done for every incoming message
* before any plugins can work with the message
*
* @param answer the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*
*/
protected void doInitialRequestHandling(MessageContext request)
throws UnitException {
//Some Implementation goes here
}
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/**
*
* hands an incoming Message (requests) to the appropriate
* plugins and let them do some handling
*
* @param request the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*/
protected abstract void delegateRequestToPlugins(MessageContext request)
throws UnitException{
//Some Implementation goes here
}
/**
*
* Final message handling that is done after all plugins did something with
* the incoming message (request) and just before the message is send
* back to the core
*
* @param request the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*/
protected abstract void doFinalRequestHandling(MessageContext request)
throws UnitException {
//Some Implementation goes here
}
/**
*
* message handling that is done for every returning message
* before any plugins can work with the message
*
* @param answer the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*
*/
protected abstract void doInitialAnswerHandling(MessageContext answer)
throws UnitException {
//Some Implementation goes here
}
/**
*
* hands an returning message (answer) to the appropriate
* plugins and let them do some handling
*
* @param answer the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*
*/
protected abstract void delegateAnswerToPlugins(MessageContext answer)
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throws UnitException {
//Some Implementation goes here
}
/**
*
* Final message handling that is done after all plugins did something with
* the returning message (answer) and just before the message is send
* back to the core
*
* @param answer the message that should be handled
* @throws UnitException thrown when something goes wrong.
*/
protected abstract void doFinalAnswerHandling(MessageContext answer)
throws UnitException {
//Some Implementation goes here
}
//Now there are some further methods which will not yet
//be called anyway and might be removed from the software someday
/**
* Activate a deployed plugin
*
* @param plugin plugin that should be activated
* @throws PluginException
*/
protected abstract void activatePlugin(de.dlr.fireblade.unit.plugin.Plugin plugin)
throws PluginException {
//Some Implementation goes here. Probably Empty.
}
/**
* Deactivate a deployed plugin
*
* @param plugin plugin that should be deactivated
* @throws PluginException
*/
protected abstract void deactivatePlugin(de.dlr.fireblade.unit.plugin.Plugin plugin)
throws PluginException {
//Some Implementation goes here. Probably Empty
}
}
The manifest le must be named unit.xml and must be placed (together with the units classes)
in the units folder of the ALG. A manifest le will look like this:
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<!DOCTYPE plugin PUBLIC "-//JPF//Java Plug-in Manifest 0.2"
"http://jpf.sourceforge.net/plugin_0_2.dtd">
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<plugin id="myShinyNewUnit" version="0.0.1" class="mypackage.MyShinyNewUnit">
<requires>
<import plugin-id="de.dlr.fireblade.core"/>
</requires>
<runtime>
<library id="myShinyLibrary" path="classes/" type="code">
<doc caption="API documentation">
<doc-ref path="api/index.html" caption="javadoc"/>
</doc>
</library>
</runtime>
<extension plugin-id="de.dlr.fireblade.core" point-id="Handler"
id="myShinyNewUnit">
<parameter id="class" value="mypackage.MyShinyNewUnit"/>
<parameter id="name" value="myShinyNewUnit"/>
<parameter id="description" value="Does something really nice"/>
</extension>
<extension-point id="myPluginsMayConnectHere">
<parameter-def id="class"/>
<parameter-def id="name"/>
<parameter-def id="description" multiplicity="one"/>
</extension-point>
</plugin>
The unit described by this manifest le will be known to the ALG by its plugin id, which ismyShinyNewU-
nit (dened in line2). It does only require the core of the ALG and provides its classes as a Library.
The part surrounded by <extension> and </extension> denes, to which extension point this unit con-
nects (which part of the ALG is extended by the Unit). For units this must always be the core. The
core oers three Extension points. All of them might be used by a Unit. units which connect to the
extension point Consumer or Supplier must implement the corresponding interface. Ordinary units
will extend the Handler extension point. This unit does not only extend the core, but it does also
provide an extension point for Plugins.
Every unit has its own data folder, where it may store its conguration and other data it needs.
This folder is a sub folder of the ALGs data folder is named with the value supplied as plugin-id in
the units manifest le. For conguration of units, a le called unit.properties should be placed in that
folder. This le is a standard Java-Properties le (Syntax: Parameter name=value). The properties
set in this le will be available to the unit under the variable myProperties.
The creation of plugins is more or less the same as the creation of Units. The plugins are subclassed
from de.dlr.reblade.core.unit.plugin.Plugin and implement the abstract methods of that class. The
manifest le diers slightly from the manifest le for Units. A plugin may not connect to any of the
extension points of the core. It must connect to an extension point which is dened by a certain unit.
A plugin may not dene further extension points 1
6.4 Implementation of the ALG
This section will provide some details about the software that has been developed as a part of this
thesis. Three main parts of the ALG have been implemented. These are the core (section 6.4.2
Core), the consumer unit (section 6.4.3 Consumer) and the supplier unit (section 6.4.4 Supplier).
Some other minor parts have been developed. These are the MessageContext (section 6.4.1 Mes-
sageContext) and some abstract classes and interfaces for units and plugins. Table 6.1 shows which
1Although this is technically possible, it is considered inconvenient.
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classes are part of the nal software. A more detailed documentation can be found in the JavaDocs.
They are generated directly from the source code and its comments and provide the complete API.
Class name abstract interface implements function
Boot no no | Initialization
CoreInterface no yes | core Interface
Core no no CoreInterface core functionalities
CoreTest no no | JUnit Test for the core
CoreException no no | Exception thrown by core
MessageContext no no | message and context information
MessageType no no | distinction requests/answers
ValidationStatus no no | validation process monitoring
MessageHistory no no | handling process monitoring
Entry no no | MessageHistory entries
EntryType no no | Typing of history entries
AbstractUnitTest yes no | Abstract JUnit TestCase
Unit yes no | Base class for all units
Consumer no yes | Consumer Interface
UnitException no no | Exception thrown by units
Plugin yes no | Base class for all plugins
PluginException no no | Exception thrown by plugins
Supplier no yes | Supplier Interface
Receiver no no Consumer Consumer unit
ConsumerServlet no no | receive HTTP requests
BasicSupplier no no | deliver SOAP messages
Table 6.1: Main classes in the nal software
6.4.1 MessageContext
The MessageContext class wraps the Axis SOAPMessage objects, in order to provide additional
functionality. It is used to provide context information about messages. These context information
is a messages type, like request or response, information about the validation process and its status
and a history, where units can provide information about checks that have been passed or failed.
MessageContext instances are created, when the consumer unit receives SOAP requests, and they
are destroyed as soon as the request has been answered. That means, that request and response
reside in the same MessageContext.
ValidationStatus
The ValidationStatus is used to distinguish between MessageContexts which passed all checks, failed
at least one check or still require further checks. The following states exist:
 VALIDATION IN PROGRESS
 VALIDATION SUCCESSFUL
 VALIDATION FAILED
 VALIDATION ERROR MESSAGES.
While the rst three status types are self explanatory, the last one needs some additional explanation.
If a message has failed validation, the status is changed to VALIDATION FAILED. The core will then
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Figure 6.3: UML-Class-Diagram for the core.
evaluate the MessageHistory and generate an error message from the provided information. This
error message is stored in the same MessageContext instance, as the original message, and the status
is changed to VALIDATION ERROR MESSAGE. A message with this type does not require further
checks (it has been created by the system) and will directly be delivered to the sender of the original
message.
MessageHistory
A MessageHistory is a collection of events that occurred during the life of a MessageContext. The
rst history entry is the creation of the message context. Further entries will follow during the
validation process. A history entry has a type and related phrase. The type of the entry determines
what happened to the MessageContext and the phrase determines which unit is related to the event
(It will usually be the unique ID of the unit or plugin which triggered the event). The existing entry
types are:
 CHECKED: appended to the history whenever the MessageContext passes a check
 CHECKFAILED: appended whenever the MessageContext fails a check
 RECEIVED: appended whenever a MessageContext is Received from a Consumer unit
 SEND: appended whenever a MessageContext is delivered via a Supplier unit
 MODIFIED: appended whenever the message of a MessageContext has been modied
 REJECTED: appended whenever a MessageContext is rejected by the core
 ACCEPTED: appended when the MessageContext has passed all tests and is nally accepted
by the core
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Figure 6.4: UML-Class-Diagram for Units.
 CONTINUED: appended whenever a MessageContext is forwarded to another unit for further
checks
 CREATED: appended when the MessageContext is newly created
 ANSWERED: appended when the MessageContext has been delivered by the supplier and the
supplier received an answer
 NOTYPE: An Entries of this Type is used whenever no other type ts
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6.4.2 Core
The core is the main part of the ALG. It has knowledge about the deployed units and the order in which
they should handle messages. It denes three JPF extension points. One for the consumer, one for
the supplier and one for all other handler units. The cores main task is, to evaluate MessageContexts
and to pass them to the units in the right order. Note that all units are JPF Plugins, as well as the
core itself. The core uses the JPF plugin mechanisms to bring up units when they are needed. The
core itself is started with a special boot class (de.dlr.reblade.Boot). This class is in large parts the
example Boot class from the JPF project page [17]. A java properties le boot.properties contains
the JPF and the logging conguration. The boot class creates a JPF PluginManager using this
conguration. It then instantiates the core and associates it with the PluginManager. This step
makes the core aware of all deployed units. Figure 6.3 shows the relations between the core and units.
6.4.3 Consumer
A consumer is the part of the ALG, which accepts incoming messages. These messages may be
accepted by many dierent transport protocols. The Consumer which has been developed for this
thesis, accepts messages over HTTP over Secure Socket Layer (HTTPS). It consists out of several
classes.
The actual unit is de.dlr.reblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver, a JPF plugin (like every unit).
The core discovers and instantiates it as its consumer using the JPF PluginManager. When initialized,
it starts an HTTP or HTTPS server. All connections which are made to that server a handled by
de.dlr.reblade.unit.consumer.receiver.ConsumerServlet, which is a Java servlet [20] implementing
the service() method. When this servlet receives a message with HTTP POST, it tries to create a
MessageContext from that message and forwards that context to the receiver class. The receiver
class will then forward the MessageContext to the core (See gure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: Path of an incoming SOAP message
This consumer does not provide many features yet. It can only be seen as a reference implemen-
tation on how to write a consumer. The supported transport protocols HTTP/HTTPS will probably
be the most common transport protocols for SOAP messages in Grids anyway. Like every Unit, the
consumer de.dlr.reblade.unit.consumer.Receiver is theoretically extensible with JPF by. subclassing
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de.dlr.reblade.unit.plugin.Plugin and writing a manifest le which associates the plugin with the an
extension point of the consumer (see [17]). But this consumer does neither dene any extension
points nor does it implement the methods which dene when and where the plugins are used. See
gure 6.4 for details about the consumers class hierarchy.
6.4.4 Supplier
The supplier is the message delivering part of the ALG. It forwards the Grid service requests to the
appropriate Grid node. As already stated in 6.4.3 Consumer , it is possible to deliver these messages
with dierent protocols. This supplier does only support HTTP and HTTPS for message delivery and
consists of a single Java class (de.dlr.reblade.unit.consumer.supplier.BasicSupplier).
The BasicSupplier is not able to determine the appropriate resource to which it should forward
the SOAP message. Instead it forwards all SOAP messages to a single precongured resource.
This is enough for really small Grids but would not be sucient in larger ones (because every node
would need its own ALG). Even though the BasicSupplier is limited like that, it provides a reference
implementation for other suppliers (which would include all the necessary features). See gure 6.4
for details about the suppliers class hierarchy.
6.5 Tests
During the development process, software tests played a major role. In order to guarantee working
software pieces, a Test-First approach has been chosen (which means that the TestCases are dened
before the software is developed). Due to the plugin architecture and the use of JPF this posed a slight
problem. JPF plugins have to communicate with a plugin manager, which is created upon initialisation
of JPF. In order to test the dierent units and plugins of the ALG with standard JUnit TestCases
[18], it would have been necessary to initialise the complete JPF for each TestCase. This problem
has been solved by the utilization of JMock [16] as a testing library. JMock extends JUnit with mock
objects, which are placeholders for unimplemented interfaces. It is possible to specify expectations
on the number of method calls to those mock objects, which makes it possible to test the complete
interaction between the tested and the unimplemented parts. For instance it was possible to test
the core, which required a consumer and a supplier, even when consumer ans supplier had not been
implemented. It was also possible to test the units (consumer and supplier) without instantiating
a core (it was replaced by a mock object in the TestCases), so that failures in the core would not
cause the TestCases for the supplier or the consumer to fail. The JPF could be decoupled from the
TestCases as well by using mock objects for the plugin manager instead of starting up the complete
JPF. JMock allowed a strict division between the dierent parts of the ALG during testing. This
made failure discovery and debugging signicantly easier.
When all parts had been implemented and succeeded in all JMock TestCases, the software has
been tested in its whole. Therefore the setup shown in gure 6.6 has been used. The ALG has
been installed on a PC running Linux and an iptables rewall. Machine A and machine B where not
able to reach each other directly, but both could reach the ALG. When requests have been created
from machine A and send to the ALG, machine B received those requests and answered them to the
ALG. The ALG then forwarded the response back to machine A. This test scenario shows, that the
developed software is actually able to fulll its task of enabling communication of resources which are
divided by a rewall. The way the message took through the system can be seen in the created log
le:
2005-06-30 17:32:17,580 [main] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.Boot logging system initialized
2005-06-30 17:32:17,892 [main] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.Boot integrity check done: errors - 0, warnings - 0
2005-06-30 17:32:18,586 [main] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver Starting ACME HTTPS Server
2005-06-30 17:32:18,587 [main] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver configuring ACME for SSL support
2005-06-30 17:32:18,636 [Thread-1] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver ACME HTTPS server is running.
2005-06-30 17:32:18,689 [main] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier Activating Unit
2005-06-30 17:32:32,693 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,693 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,694 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,694 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:33,006 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier transferring SOAP message with HTTP GET
2005-06-30 17:32:33,101 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/1 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:32:33,159 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/1 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:32:33,160 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:33,160 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/1
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2005-06-30 17:32:33,446 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:32:33,447 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:32:33,447 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:32:33,447 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:32:33,458 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier Transferring SOAP message with HTTP GET
2005-06-30 17:32:33,531 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/2 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:32:33,582 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/2 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:32:33,582 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:32:33,584 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/2
2005-06-30 17:33:38,481 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:33:38,482 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:33:38,482 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:33:38,482 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:33:38,510 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier transferring SOAP message with HTTP POST
2005-06-30 17:33:38,603 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/3 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:33:38,611 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/3 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:33:38,611 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:33:38,611 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/3
2005-06-30 17:34:43,760 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:34:43,761 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:34:43,761 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:34:43,761 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:34:43,773 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier transferring SOAP message with HTTP POST
2005-06-30 17:34:43,828 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/4 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:34:43,872 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/4 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:34:43,872 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:34:43,872 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/4
2005-06-30 17:35:14,776 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/5
2005-06-30 17:35:14,777 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/5
2005-06-30 17:35:14,777 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/5
2005-06-30 17:35:14,777 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/5
2005-06-30 17:35:14,815 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier transferring SOAP message with HTTP POST
2005-06-30 17:35:14,871 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/5 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:35:14,917 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/5 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:35:14,918 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/5
2005-06-30 17:35:14,918 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/5
As you can see, there have been 5 dierent messages from machine A to machine B (with message
ids defaultCore/1 to defaultCore/5). Some of them have been HTTP Get requests and some have
been HTTP Post requests. All messages took the intended path (machine A ! consumer ! core
! supplier ! machine B ! supplier ! core ! consumer ! machine B). Compare with this snippet
of the log le:
2005-06-30 17:32:32,693 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,693 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver finalizing message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,694 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:32,694 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:33,006 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier transferring SOAP message with HTTP GET
2005-06-30 17:32:33,101 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/1 delivered.
2005-06-30 17:32:33,159 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.supplier.BasicSupplier message defaultCore/1 has been answered
2005-06-30 17:32:33,160 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.core.Core handling message defaultCore/1
2005-06-30 17:32:33,160 [Request handler] INFO de.dlr.fireblade.unit.consumer.receiver.Receiver handling message defaultCore/1
Figure 6.6: Test scenario for the ALG
6.6 Installation and Conguration
In order to use the ALG it is of course necessary to install and congure it correctly. The installation
from the sources is really simple. At rst the binaries are needed. If you possess the source code, you
can build those binaries with the command
~/path/to/source# ant all clean
this will create a zip le in the current folder containing the binaries. Simply unzip that le to the
folder where you want the ALG to reside (on a machine that is placed in the DMZ).
/path/to/source# mv fireblade-<someversionstring>.zip /path/to/my/alg/
cd /path/to/my/alg
unzip fireblade-<someversionstring>.zip
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Actually the software is now able to run, but not very well congured. The core and all units have
their own conguration le. In order to change the conguration of the core, create a le called
core.properties in the data folder of your installation (the place where you extracted the binaries to).
Put the properties that you would like to be set for the core in that le. See table 6.2 for possible
properties.
cd /path/to/my/alg/data
vi core.properties
// configure the core
Furthermore you have to create the conguration les for consumer and supplier. See table 6.3 and
6.4 for the properties that are available to congure the developed consumer and supplier.
cd /path/to/my/alg/data
mkdir <plugin-id of the consumer>
cd <plugin-id of the consumer>
vi core.properties
// configure the consumer
cd ..
mkdir <plugin-id of the supplier>
cd <plugin-id of the supplier>
vi core.properties
// configure the supplier
Now that you have congured core, consumer and supplier, you have to deploy keystore les for
both of them. Those keystore les can be crated with the keytool command. See the man page of
that command (man keytool) for details about this. because the consumer does not support client
authorization yet, it is only needed to setup a certicate for the consumer and get it signed by a
Certicate Authority (CA). Since the supplier needs to authenticate the Grid resource which it should
talk to, it is needed to import that resources certicate into the keystore of the supplier.
The machine where the ALG is installed must additionally be congured in a way that enables
access to the ALG from the internet and enables the ALG to access the local network. This can for
instance be accomplished by opening the listening port of the consumer and by employing a second
network interface. The open port enables machines from the internet to access the ALG and the
second network interface could be used in order to access local machines.
Property Function Default value
reblade.core.id identication string for the core defaultCore
reblade.unit.consumer plugin id of the consumer unit
that should be used
de.dlr.reblade.consumer.basic
reblade.unit.supplier plugin id of the supplier unit that
should be used
de.dlr.reblade.supplier.basic
reblade.unit.handlers list of plugin ids of the handler
units that should be used in the
given order
empty
Table 6.2: Properties for conguration of the core
6.7 Limitations
Due to the short development time of about two months, the realization has some limitations com-
pared to the concept. It lacks features like load balancing and core coupling as well as content ltering
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Property Function Default value
reblade.consumer.port port number where the consumer
should listen for incoming re-
quests
8181
reblade.consumer.keystorele name of the keystore le where
the SSL certicates are stored
ServerKeyStore
reblade.consumer.keystorepass password for that keystorele getaccess
reblade.consumer.keystoretype type of the keystorele (see man
keytool)
JKS
Table 6.3: Properties for conguration of the consumer
Property Function Default value
reblade.supplier.destination.host host name of the target resource
which should receive the requests
localhost
reblade.supplier.destination.port port number where the target re-
source is listening for requests
8181
reblade.supplier.keystore.le name of the keystore le where
the SSL certicates are stored
clientKeyStore
reblade.supplier.keystore.password password for that keystorele getaccess
reblade.supplier.keystore.type type of the keystorele (see man
keytool)
JKS
reblade.supplier.secure.protocol SSL encryption protocol TLS
reblade.supplier.secure.algorithm SSL encryption algorithm SunX509
Table 6.4: Properties for conguration of the supplier
and validation. By now it does not support any Grid communication but plain SOAP messages. Nei-
ther the Consumer, nor the Supplier support HTTPS client authentication. The harshest limitation
is given by the supplier. It does not support multiple resources yet (see 6.4.4 Supplier). This renders
the realization irrelevant for practical use. Even when the supplier would be changed or extended in
order to enable multiple resources per ALG, it would probably pose a massive bottleneck because no
eorts have been taken in order to optimize it. The lacking load balancing mechanisms add to this
limitation. Furthermore the setup conguration is rather complicated. There are no tools which help
an Administrator with this task by now. It can be seen as a framework with a reference implemen-
tation of the main features which can be the basis for further work, but it is far from a stable and
fully-featured product.
The actual overhead which is created by this solution is hard to estimate. It largely depends on
the number of units which check the SOAP messages. In theory it is possible to deploy a innite
number of units. This means that the overhead can become innitly large. Additionaly it depends
on the transport protocol used by supplier and consumer. A supplier which works with HTTP would
be faster than one working with HTTPS or one working via email. None of the developed classes
have been optimized for speed (latency and throughput) yet. Since Grid applications are usually
emberassing parallel (or latency tolerant), A optimization for throughput might be mormeaningful
than one optimizing latency. It can be assumed, that those applications which require high throughput
or low latenncy would communicate over specialized protocols. The units which add support for those
protocols should then be optimized for the according as well.
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Chapter 7
Summary
The problem that today's Grids have with communication over rewall protected network borders has
been described in this thesis, which also presented and compared several concepts for solving this
rewall issue. The chosen concept, of utilizing an Application Level Gateway which creates proxies
for Grid services has been implemented in large parts. This has been done with respect to the large
number of possibly required protocols, what led to a highly extensible plugin architecture. Even though
this implementation is not yet capable of solving the problem completely, it already demonstrates some
advantages over other concepts, like its transparency.
By extensively testing the ALG during development, it was possible to create software which
enabled communication between two machines which where separated by a rewall.
Not only the concept, but also the implementation have been discussed. While the developed
architecture oers a transparent and secure solution for the issue, it might become a problem itself,
when it comes to performance and especially to latency tolerance. Additionally the developed ALG
supports has signicantly inferior features to those, the other presented concepts might provide.
However these features will most likely be implemented soon. Recently another bachelor thesis which
deals with this issue has been started at SISTEC. During that thesis, Thijs Metsch will implement
the missing content validation which has been identied as a major security advantage of the ALG
concept over the other concepts. Additionally the author of this thesis will continue to work on this
implementation in the future, and it will play a role in the future research of the FI-RG at the GGF.
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